Tab 9

Case Name:

Air Canada (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF Section 191 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Air Canada and those Subsidiaries listed on Schedule "A"
APPLICATION UNDER the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

[2004] O.J. No. 842

47 C.B.R. (4th) 189

129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 451

2004 CarswellOnt 870

Court File No. 03-CL-4932

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

Farley J.

Heard: February 19, 2004.
Judgment: February 22, 2004.

(29 paras.)

Creditors and debtors -- Debtors' relief legislation -- Companies' creditors arrangement legislation -- Application of concepts of fairness and equity -- Breach of order.

Motion by the creditor, Air Canada, for an order enforcing an order requiring the respondent Toronto Airport Authority to allow it to relocate its operations to a new terminal. The original order was made in April 2003. The parties had also signed a memorandum of understanding in 2001, with respect to the creditor's operations at the Authority's airport, and the proposed relocation to the new terminal. Following the creditor's commencement of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings, the Authority wrote to the creditor, expressing its hope that the proceedings would not impact of the proposed use by the creditor of a new terminal. However, in December 2003, a competitor of the creditor, WestJet, approached the Authority about using the new terminal. The creditor brought an application for an order enjoining the Authority from interfering in any way with its development or use of the terminal, pursuant to the agreement between the parties. The parties were in dispute as to the interpretation of the memorandum of understanding and as to the original order, including the creditor's

preferred status in using the new terminal.

HELD: Motion allowed. The apparent lack of trust, understanding and documentation between the parties was regrettable, particularly in light of the creditor's ongoing difficulties and CCRA proceedings. The agreement between the parties had to be interpreted in light of their ongoing relationship, and with regard to business efficacy. The creditor had done what was required of it, both under the agreement, and under the order. It was clear that the parties had not, until December 2003, anticipated that any airline but the creditor would be primarily using the new terminal. Therefore, there was no reason not to enforce the agreement between the parties; the order requested would issue.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 191.

Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Counsel:

David R. Byers, Sean F. Dunphy and Katherine J. Menear, for Air Canada.
Joseph M. Steiner and Donald Hanna, for the Greater Toronto Airport Authority.
Peter Griffin and Monique Jilesen, for the Monitor.
James C. Tory, for the Board of Directors.
Howard Gorman, for the Unsecured Creditors Committee.
Robert Thornton and Greg Azeff, for GECAS.
Dan MacDonald, Q.C., for WestJet.

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1 **FARLEY J.**:-- As argued, this was a motion by Air Canada (AC) for an Order enforcing paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Amended and Restated Initial Order dated April 1, 2003 (Initial Order) requiring the Greater Toronto Airports' Authority (Authority) not to discontinue, alter or interfere with the right, contract, arrangement, agreement, license or permit to allow AC to relocate its domestic operations (including baggage handling and gating) to Terminal 1 New (NT) and in doing so to have fixed preferential use of all 14 contact gates (bridge gates) in the domestic area of NT during the initial development phase of NT, subject to the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Understanding between AC and Authority made as of the 31st day of January, 2001 (MOU) and the Terminal Facilities Allocation Protocol (Protocol) as such may evolve from time to time. Apparently the 9 hard stand commuter gates (tarmac gates) are no longer an issue for AC.

2 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Initial Order provide:

> 6. THIS COURT ORDERS that during the Stay Period, no person, firm, corporation, governmental authority, or other entity shall, without leave, discontinue, fail to renew, alter, interfere with or terminate any right, contract, arrangement, agreement, licence or permit in favour of an Applicant or the Applicants' Property or held by or on behalf of an Applicant, including as a result of any default or non-performance by an Applicant, the making or filing of these proceedings or any allegation contained in these proceedings.
> 7. THIS COURT ORDERS that, during the Stay Period, (a) all persons, firms, corporations, governmental authorities, airports, airport authority or air

navigation authorities or any other entity (including, without limitation, NAV Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions ("OSFI"), IBM Canada Limited and BCE Nexxia Inc.) having written or oral agreements with an Applicant (including, without limitation, leases, pooling or consignment agreements, multilateral interline traffic agreements, codeshare agreements, Tier III Commercial Agreements, gate access agreements, frequent flyer programs or statutory or regulatory mandates) for the supply of goods and/or services (including, without limitation, real property, computer software and hardware, aircraft parts, aircraft maintenance services and related equipment, ground handling services and equipment, catering, office supplies and equipment, reservations, employee uniforms, crew accommodations, meals and commissary, communication and other data services, accounting and payroll servicing, insurance or indemnity, clearing, banking, cash management, credit cards or credit card processing, transportation, utility or other required services), by or to an Applicant or any of the Applicants' Property are hereby restrained until further order of this Court from discontinuing, failing to renew on terms no more onerous than those existing prior to these proceedings, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services so long as the normal prices or charges for such goods and services received after the date of this order are paid in accordance with present payment practices (for greater certainty and notwithstanding the terms of any federal or provincial statute or the terms of any lease or any present payment practices, lessors cannot alter, reconcile or recalculate the amount of any rent, operating, maintenance or other expenses payable by any Applicant so as to recover in whole or in part any amount payable by an Applicant in respect of any period of time prior to April 1, 2003 or to compensate it in whole or in part for not receiving amounts owing to it by any Applicant in respect of any period of time prior to April 1, 2003), or as may be hereafter negotiated from time to time, and (b) subject to Section 11.1 of the CCAA, all persons being party to fuel consortia agreements, or agreements or arrangements for hedging the price of, or forward purchasing of fuel, are hereby restrained from terminating, suspending, modifying, cancelling, or otherwise interfering with such hedging agreements or arrangements, notwithstanding any provisions in such agreements or arrangements to the contrary, provided that nothing herein shall require any bank to accept bankers acceptances issued after April 1, 2003. For greater certainty, any reference to "airport authority" made in this order shall include both authorities and any other types of legal entity operating an airport.

3 I have frequently observed in these CCAA proceedings that what is needed amongst all stakeholders and AC in all their various relationships is trust and respect flowing in every direction. I regret to say that I think it a fair observation here that trust and respect does not flow in either direction between AC and Authority. That is unfortunate and in my view completely unnecessary and inappropriate; especially when one considers that AC traffic made up 60% of the traffic which went through the Authority in 2003, and it recognized that AC is building a hub at the Toronto airport so that both sides should recognize the importance of one to the other and considering that AC is attempting to do significant restructuring in these CCAA proceedings. For whatever reasons, it appears that both sides of this equation were content to try to get an edge, even a little edge, on the other in their dealings. Each wishes its own slant on their relationship, but particularly as to how the written word should be interpreted. Suffice it to say that the agreement between AC and Authority is to be interpreted on a common sense, business efficacy/avoidance of commercial absurdity basis and is not to be restricted to the terms of any formal written agreement (as is the case of the settlement documentation as to Terminal One (T1) and

Terminal Two (T2) executed between AC and Authority which agreements contain "entire agreement" clauses and which also provide that there is to be a separate agreement as to NT). There is no "entire agreement" clause in the subject documentation between AC and the Authority. Indeed there is no requirement that this relationship re NT be reduced to a written agreement as the T1 and T2 agreements provide that they:

> Shall not be construed as an agreement or understanding between [Authority] and [AC] with respect to any matters relating to [NT] which matters will be dealt with in separate arrangements between [Authority] and [A.C.]

4 John Kaldeway, the Vice President, Transition Programs of Authority wrote AC on May 29, 2003, two months into the CCAA proceedings (in dealing with an Initial Order which Authority has not come back on or as to this aspect appealed), stating in a most reasonable way its general concern that the Authority's operations and particularly its transition to NT would not be impacted adversely by AC's CCAA proceedings:

> The [Authority] assigns air carriers to the various terminals at the Airport in such a manner as to ensure the most efficient use of airport resources. It has been and continues to be our intent to have Air Canada, and its alliance and code-share (SA) partners, as the first occupants of the new terminal (NT). This, of course, assumes both that a successful restructuring by Air Canada has occurred or is continuing with an ongoing operational configuration which would warrant a transfer of operations to the new terminal, as well as the negotiation of the appropriate commercial arrangements.
>
> It is important through the process of [AC's] restructuring and the completion of the construction of the first phase of the new terminal that we maintain full and effective communications on how the restructuring and the final completion of the new terminal will impact and shape our mutual plans. In this regard, this letter will discuss important issues relating to the completion of the construction and the transition of air carrier operations into the new terminal.
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> ...
>
> AC and the Authority have entered into an Operating Agreement and Lease in respect of [T2] dated January 31, 2001. As you are aware, upon the completion of the first stage of [NT], the [Authority] must proceed immediately with the construction of Pier-F and the new international hammerhead. Until the opening of Pier-F, we expect that [AC's] domestic operations will be conducted from the terminal while international passenger processing will be conducted in the new terminal with boarding and deplaning to occur at the Infield Terminal to the extent these will not yet be able to be accommodated at the new terminal. Transborder [Transborder being interpreted as trans U.S. border] operations will remain at [T2]. In order to ensure the continued development of [NT] as planned, [AC] and the [Authority] will have to establish an operations protocol to provide for the transfer of operations from Gates 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 218, and 220 to [NT] in November [2003]. These gates serve domestic traffic only.
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> ...
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> Finally, in view of the demands upon [AC's] as it proceeds with its restructuring and

> the critical phase of our development program, it is imperative that we establish an appropriate and effective line of communication between us that can respond in real time to emerging issues. Please confirm that John Segaert is the individual in Toronto who is able to bind [AC] with respect to these transitional issues. ...

5 It is interesting to note that this question of the fixed preferential use of the 14 bridge gates being in issue only flared up in January, 2004 although the Authority indicates that there were rumours circulating in December, 2003 as to AC's major domestic competitor WestJet wanting to use NT. I note that apparently there are sufficient facilities in NT to allow for the checking in and baggage handling of SA international flights but that for these flights passengers would have to be bussed to the infield facility. It also appears that similarly domestic non-AC flights could be included at NT although bussing would be either to Terminal Three (T3) or (T2) in that event. Curiously, there seems to be somewhat of a mismatch of resources in that the Authority has built recently more bridge gates at T3 but has not companioned these new gates with check-in and baggage handling facilities.

6 AC filed its motion on February 5, 2004; the Authority responded with its material on February 12th, AC provided a reply affidavit of Monte Brewer (Brewer) on February 17th; the Authority responded with a further affidavit of Howard Bohan (Bohan) the same day; AC then provided a further affidavit of John Segaert (Segaert) on February 18th; and the Authority responded with the last word with a further Bohan affidavit of February 19th, the day of the hearing. The factum of AC is dated February 17, 2004; the factum of the Authority is dated February 18, 2004. There was no cross-examinations on any of the affidavits - either there was not enough time to do so (which is doubtful as to those in the February 5th and responding February 12th motion records or AC and the Authority were both content to live with any statements of the other side (notwithstanding professed disagreement in the latter affidavits), in other words, they were content to live with the ambiguities, as it does not seem that either side had any appetite for cross-examination. It therefore falls to this court to deal with the morass of material and to attempt to determine what is the agreement between AC and the Authority as to the use of the 14 bridge gates in question based on an objective and reasonable view of matters including commercial reasonability and avoidance of absurdity. My conclusion is based upon the foregoing and the balance of probabilities in interpreting the evidence.

7 It is also curious to note that in many instances the affidavits referred to meetings, discussions and other contacts without specifying a precise date. The lack of precise dates for matters such as these would lead me to the reasonable conclusion that the active participants in these situations did not keep a written record of such, but are now only relying upon their memories as to dates. One would have thought that ordinarily matters of this nature would have been either documented in exchanges between the parties or in contemporaneous notes made at the time. That they were not would lead me to the reasonable conclusion that neither AC nor the Authority had the slightest expectation that as to the domestic use of NT during its first phase, the sole user would not be AC, absent unusual circumstances. Certainly AC was the only domestic carrier to be involved in discussions, liaison, planning, co-ordination and trial runs and testing. I would note that WestJet is a very recent new-comer to the NT scene (although it previously had some now existing operations out of T3) as discussions after WestJet's approach to the Authority about moving WestJet's Hamilton based flight operations to NT only happened in December, 2003; one might reasonably question whether WestJet would be able to get up to a co-ordinated speed for operations at NT for an April 18, 2004 start given that it has not been involved in any of this planning and testing over the past several years. WestJet claims that AC's motive in bringing this motion is to avoid the competition; one may similarly question whether WestJet's motives were "innocent".

8 That AC appeared to both AC and to the Authority as the only game in town up to at least December, 2003 would lead one (and it would appear both AC and the Authority as well) to consider

that one need not dot all the "i"s and cross all the "t"s as to the 14 bridge gates. Further it is within that context that one must interpret the Authority's advice that AC and its SA partners would be the first occupants of NT as being that in respect of domestic carriers it was expected between AC and the Authority that AC would be the only domestic carrier in NT during phase one, subject to the "use it or lose it" provision of the Protocol and the provision that if other airline carriers could not be reasonably accommodated at T2 or T3 before phase two at NT came into play. It would be unreasonable to interpret the element of first occupant as being satisfied by AC domestic going in on April 6, 2004 and WestJet going in twelve days later on April 18, 2004, as per WestJet's January 14, 2004 press release. Curiously the Authority does not directly advise AC before its January 28, 2004 letter which indicates that AC gets not the 14 expected bridge gates on a fixed preferential basis, but rather only 8, with the requirement to share the other 6 with WestJet on a common usage basis. The Authority in my view is not the only one to play it cosy and coy; AC states that in late December it came up with a flight schedule that would allow it to have all of its domestic flights gated out of NT but it only advised the Authority of this on January 12, 2004, immediately after Calin Rovinescu of AC (second in command and the Chief Restructuring Officer in the CCAA proceedings) confirmed with Lou Turpen, the CEO of the Authority that the Authority was having discussions with WestJet, the nature of such discussions was not revealed.

9 I think it is fair to observe that one is disappointed with the lack of trust and respect flowing both ways as well as the lack of communication, co-operation and common sense. I say this notwithstanding that I appreciate how difficult running a major airline or a major airport is, particularly as to co-ordinating and accommodating ever changing scheduling. However, apparently the Authority is on record as not wishing to be bothered with interim scheduling advice but rather to be informed as to the schedule for the next season (the summer season) on a finalized basis in late January 2004 (January 31, 2004 being the last IATA date for such schedules). The Authority complains that usually changes made at such late date are only "tweaks", not the types of changes made by AC in mid-January and then as changed on a wholesale basis later in that month. However there does not appear to be any such restriction on magnitude or quality. One should also observe that the Authority during November and even into December 2003 was having meetings with AC at which the Authority was requesting AC to see if it could adjust its domestic schedule so that it would all be gated out of NT with no bussing to T2 (and therefore no bus terminal is to be built there). It may well be that AC was incentivized to re-think its position once it heard rumours of WestJet's interest. I would not find that unusual. I have no doubt that AC thought that it had the luxury of keeping its options open as to having overflow (if any) as to its domestic flights in phase one of the NT accommodated by bussing to T2 (with a new bus terminal to be built by and at the expense of the Authority which would have the extra benefit of accommodating a swing flight plane from domestic to transborder use (or vice versa) at T2; that luxury would not "cost" AC anything so long as its expected position of being the only domestic carrier at NT during phase one was maintained).

10 In Segaert's February 5, 2004 affidavit he states at para. 43:

> 43. In or about September, 2003, I had discussions with Mr. Howard Bohan, General Manager, New Terminal 1 Client Task Force, GTAA, regarding the revisions to version 6 of the TFAP. At the time, we discussed the application of the fixed preferential use gates and common use gates provisions of the TFAP in connection with the opening of phase 1 of T1 New. Our discussions for some time had all been premised on Air Canada moving its domestic operations into T1 New from Terminal 2. Mr. Bohan at that time indicated to me that the 14 domestic contact gates would be designated as fixed preferential use gates including reserved facilities that Air Canada would be in a position to control in the manner prescribed by the TFAP. The 9 hard stand commuter gates in T1 New he indicated would be designated as common use gates with Air Canada

> Jazz being fully accommodated in these facilities with some potential surplus capacity available. At that time as at all other times up until January 28, 2004, there was never any suggestion or doubt expressed by GTAA in their discussions with me that there would be any other domestic carriers operating out of T1 New from the initial phase until completion of the construction of subsequent phases of the development.

11 Segaert was the liaison decision-maker of AC requested by the Authority in the May 29, 2003 letter.

12 Bohan in his February 12, 2004 affidavit does not deny that but attempts to explain away the impact of same at paragraphs 2-7:

> 2. I have reviewed the affidavit of John Segaert sworn February 5, 2004, and in particular paragraph 43 of that affidavit. Mr. Segaert implies that the GTAA has altered an agreement or arrangement that Air Canada would have the permanent use of all fourteen contact gates at T1New on a fixed preferential basis. This is untrue. The discussions described by Mr. Segaert in paragraph 43 are not accurately described and, taken in conjunction with the balance of Mr. Segaert's affidavit, distort the discussions we had concerning the application of the Terminal Facilities Allocation Protocol ("TFAP") for T1New.
> 3. The discussions referred to at paragraph 43 of Mr. Segaert's affidavit took place at a meeting late in May or early June, 2003. At that time, the scheduled opening date for T1New was October 2003. Our discussions centred on the application of the TFAP for the purpose of designating fixed preferential contact gates and common use contact gates, as well as fixed preferential check-in counters and common use counters, at the time of the proposed opening date for T1New.
> 4. Our discussions at that time were based on version 5 of the TFAP. A copy of the TFAP version 5 is attached as Exhibit "P" to John Kaldeway's affidavit.
> 5. Under the TFAP methodology, the first step is for the GTAA to determine the number of gates or check-in counters available for allocation on a fixed preferential use basis, under section 4.4.1(ii), which provided:
>
> > (ii) Based on the processing standards and the peak gate and Check-in Facility demand analysis, the GTAA will determine the number of Fixed Preferential gates and check-in positions to be allocated from the available gates and Check-in Facilities that have been designated by the GTAA as being available for allocation on a Fixed Preferential Use Basis. For greater certainty, such available gate and Check-in Facilities shall not include any gates and check-in positions that have been designated as GTAA Reserved or common Use Terminal Facilities.
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> 6. Section 8 of the TFAP provides that 10% of the available facilities will be designated GTAA reserve facilities. (Sections 4.4.1(ii) and 8 are unchanged in the current version 7 of the TFAP.)
> 7. At that time, in late May or June, 2003, the GTAA anticipated Air Canada to be the only domestic carrier that would be operating from T1New at the time of opening. Accordingly, the GTAA then considered that all contact gates at T1New, including 2 GTAA reserved use gates, could be available for allocation on a fixed preferential basis.

13 One should also have regard to the November 23, 2001 Authority Map showing SA domestic (that is AC domestic) as using all gates - and no other carrier. The drawings presented by the Authority are Feb. 10, 11, 2004 and therefore produced only for the hearing.

14 It seems to me that the understanding between AC and the Authority which would have the status and equivalence of the type of agreement contemplated by the subject paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Initial Order under the CCAA was that in the prevailing circumstances and as these parties saw the Protocol (and MOU) playing out during phase one, AC was to have the fixed preferential use of the 14 bridge gates at NT subject to the use it or lose it proviso and the unable to accommodate elsewhere process.

15 Further given this understanding, then if the Authority wished to change course, it is constrained to do so in accord with the MOU and the Protocol in place from time to time. The Protocol is a work in progress and will continue to be so not only in phase one of the NT but during the complete functional life of the NT, unless otherwise replaced.

16 It does not seem to me that the Protocol (or the MOU) can be reasonably interpreted as advanced by the Authority that the Authority has the right and obligation to determine how many common use bridge gates it needs to accommodate carriers it wishes to place in the NT and that any being left over would be available for fixed preferential use (to a carrier which represented 60% of the traffic in the NT as to any type of flight - domestic, transborder and international collectively which at the present time could only be AC and at anytime could only be one carrier as simple mathematics dictate).

17 Given that Segaert was the AC liaison co-ordinating person as requested by the Authority, I do not see that any advice from anyone even in December, 2003 at the Authority to Rick Leach (Leach) or others at AC would have any legal impact. Given that understanding, I am not so surprised that Leach may not have focussed on what was being suggested to him that AC would only get a certain number of bridge gates on a fixed preferential basis. Further, since these suggestions were made at a time when it was understood that on a practical basis AC was the only domestic carrier for phase one of the NT - understood by both the Authority and AC until the approach to the Authority by WestJet in December and thereafter by AC alone, in permitted ignorance until otherwise advised in January, 2004.

18 I understand that the opening of NT was delayed from the expected date of October, 2003 to April 5, 2004, but that such delay was not occasioned by AC. If matters had progressed without such delay, then it would appear that AC would not only have been allocated all 14 bridge gates on a fixed preferential basis, as indicated and evidenced by the discussion between Bohan and Segaert, but that it would have been functionally operating same. I do not see that the delay or the lack of present functional use gives the Authority any flexibility to change its mind as to AC having these bridge gates on such basis. If the Authority wishes to accommodate WestJet at NT, then it would have to follow the Protocol until either AC loses some or all of the 14 gates on a fixed preferential basis for lack of use or additional gates are built in subsequent phases (it is perhaps curious that phase one of the NT has so few gates relatively speaking although subsequent phases will bring the total to over 100; apparently most of that results from NT being squeezed into a space between T2 and T3 and for the interim having to exist in conjunction with T1 before it is demolished and replaced by runway and new construction of piers at NT).

19 The Authority (and indeed WestJet) stressed that the Authority's mandate was to provide equitable access for all air carriers. However one would observe as has been observed frequently in other CCAA proceedings that equitable treatment does not necessarily mean equal treatment. In these circumstances I do not see that there is anything truly inequitable about following the Protocol if WestJet wishes to be accommodated at the NT through use of any of the bridge gates. I pause to note that WestJet apparently could be accommodated at the NT for check-in and baggage handling if it were content to have its

passengers bussed to either T2 or T3. The Authority downplayed to the maximum the inconvenience of such bussing, indicating that it would only involve the same amount of time as it would take a passenger to otherwise walk to the end of one of the piers of NT. One may be sceptical of that assertion but that is the official position of the Authority. I would also be of the view that the Authority has not in any material respect satisfied its obligations to show that it cannot otherwise accommodate WestJet at either T2 or T3, there were no figures as to usage of the check-in and baggage facilities being overloaded at T3 and there are "surplus" gates there; similarly there was no explanation as to the need to "rewire" the computer system as it would seem that under ordinary circumstances the existing cabling could remain intact and only the peripherals of computers would need to be replaced (with their own compatible software programs) and the baggage handling question was not explained as to why it needed to be replaced (or indeed why WestJet could not contract AC to handle this aspect for it at T2). One would also observe that apparently the Authority might be able to accommodate WestJet at NT by using the tarmac gates on a common use basis.

20 I note that AC was willing to accommodate WestJet as to all or part of the computer facilities at T2. Additionally AC indicated that as opposed to leaving the Protocol (as it now exists in version 7) for review after a year of experience to see what, if any, adjustments should be made, it was content to do this after 6 months.

21 I should also note that the Protocol is written without limiting its effect to AC alone. This is appropriate since AC even at the initial stage was not to be the only user as there were to be other international users. But additionally, the Protocol was being developed for use throughout all phases of the NT to and including the end of its functional life.

22 The Authority does not dispute that the usage by AC for its domestic flights as per the last schedule would give the highest use rate of all the terminals at the airport. Having done what the Authority asked it to do up to and including less than a month before WestJet came on the scene, namely put all its domestic flights gated out of NT without the necessity for bussing, I find it passing strange that the Authority would then do its calculations to bring AC below 60% usage as to certain gates by the device of the Authority - not AC - indicating that certain of AC's domestic flights would be bussed to T2.

23 The Authority submits that if I decide in AC's favour on this issue, it will have an impact beyond AC's proposed emergence from CCAA proceedings. All that is required of the Authority is that it respect the MOU and the Protocol in accordance with the internal processing of these documents at least until emergence (one way or the other) from the CCAA proceedings. What the Authority does after that time is up to it, although it would continue to be governed by those documents (in other words I suppose the Authority could decide to breach their provisions, in which case AC could, if it desired, proceed in the ordinary course with litigation, including going for injunctive relief at that time).

24 Bohan notes that the Authority and WestJet negotiated without disclosing same to the public, including carriers at the airport including AC. He observed that the same confidential arrangements were in place as were for AC moving its Tango operations to T3. However he did not comment on the magnitude of that or its relative impact on the other carriers at T3 which is an acknowledged common use facility - with no exclusive gate, check-in or baggage arrangement or anything "in between" as is the fixed preferential use subject to the various aforesaid provisions in place for NT. I note what Brewer states in his February 17th affidavit at paras. 11 and 2 respectively:

> 11. With respect to paragraph 31, I am advised by Mr. Dave Robinson, Senior Director, Corporate Real Estate, Air Canada, and do verily believe that as part of the Settlement in 2001, Air Canada agreed to give up its exclusive use of

Terminal 2 despite the fact that Air Canada had made significant investments therein. While the GTAA would not agree to exclusive use of T1 New, the GTAA and Air Canada came up with a business solution and agreed to the concept of "Fixed Preferential Use" of facilities for domestic and transborder operations at T1 New. I am advised by Mr. Robinson and do verily believe that the concept of Fixed Preferential Use was agreed upon to give Air Canada comfort that it would be able to accommodate its entire domestic and transborder operations in T1 New with Fixed Preferential Use of the domestic and transborder facilities in relation to other carriers during the initial phase of T1 New, subject to the "use it or lose it" principle and subject to the GTAA maximizing facilities throughout Pearson Airport before accommodating another carrier at T1 New. I am advised by Mr. Robinson and do verily believe that Air Canada believed that it was protected by the provision in the MOU requiring the GTAA prove that Air Canada wasn't using its gates efficiently and therefore ought to "lose" them and that the GTAA was protected because Air Canada would lose its Fixed Preferential gates if not using them efficiently. I am advised by Mr. Robinson and do verily believe that Fixed Preferential Use of the T1 New was one of the critical components of the Settlement.

2. The GTAA Affidavits misconstrue statements and concepts from the First A.C. Affidavits. The GTAA Affidavits suggest that Air Canada's position is that it is entitled to "exclusive" use of all gates at T1 New. This is not the position set out in the First A.C. Affidavits. The position of Air Canada is that it was agreed that Air Canada would be the first tenant of the initial phase of the development of T1 New and that it would have the use of all gates in this first phase on a Fixed Preferential Use basis. As set out in the First A.C. Affidavits, all planning for the development and opening of the initial phase of T1 New was based on and consistent with this agreement. Air Canada's position is that it has always been agreed that the allocation of Fixed Preferential Use gates to Air Canada would ensure that it would have first call on as many gates as would reasonably be required to accommodate its operations in T1 New at a reasonable intensity of use subject only to (a) the "use it or lose it" principle enshrined in the MOU; and (b) the provisions enabling new carriers to be introduced to T1 New only when the use of other terminals have been maximized. It was always understood that at the completion of the development of T1 New, there would be sufficient terminal facilities available to accommodate other carriers.

25 It seems to me reasonable in the circumstances prevailing that the contractual relationship between AC and the Authority as to the fixed preferential use of the 14 bridge gates should be interpreted in the overall context of the above.

26 I find that the Authority has committed the 14 bridge gates to AC on a fixed preferential basis pursuant to the Protocol as established and the MOU and that such commitment should be honoured in regard to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Initial Order.

27 The purpose of the CCAA has been characterized by many courts as involving a broad balancing of a plurality of stakeholder interests, recognizing that the interest of most parties will be best served by the survival of the applicant debtor corporation: see Elan Corp. v. Comisky (1991), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (CA) at pp. 306-7 (Doherty, J.A. dissenting on unrelated grounds). I see no reason why the Authority should not be held to the understanding and agreement which I have found it had with AC in this regard. Where an affected party is in breach of an initial order (which in this case remains intact as to the

paragraphs in question and unappealed or otherwise dealt with on a comeback basis by the Authority in this regard), the court may order the breaching entity to comply with the initial order: see Re Skydome Corp., [1999] O.J. No. 221 (Gen. Div.) at paras. 2 and 20. In that regard I order the Authority to live up to its commitment to provide AC with the fixed preferential use of the 14 bridge gates at the NT, subject only to the provisos in the Protocol (and MOU). As offered by AC, the Protocol may be revisited after six months' experience.

28 I note that all concerned (including AC, WestJet and the Authority) wanted me to release this decision as quickly as possible with a view to stabilizing the situation and getting on with implementation.

29 Order accordingly.

FARLEY J.

cp/e/nc/qw/qlhcc

drs/e/qleet/qlsez/qlmll